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JOINDER & SEVERANCE OF OFFENSES
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
This article discusses joinder and severance of offenses.
An article examining joinder and severance of defendants
was published in the last issue. See generally 2 Katz &
Giannelli, Baldwin's Ohio Practice Criminal Law ch. 57
"'" (1996).
The importance of joinder cannot be overestimated. As
one commentator has noted:
The way in which the prosecutor chooses to combine
offenses or defendants in a single indictment is perhaps second in importance only to his decision to prosecute. Whether a defendant is tried en masse with
many other participants in an alleged crime, or in a
separate trial of his own, will often be decisive of the
outcome. Equally decisive may be the number of offenses which are cumulated against a single defendant, particularly if they are unconnected. 8 Moore's
Federal Practice 8-3 (Cipes ed. 1993).
Criminal Rule 8(A) covers the joinder of offenses in one .
indictment, information, or complaint. Rule 13 governs the
consolidation for trial of offenses where there is more than
one charging instrument. Finally, Rule 14 governs severance of offenses. Joinder issues arise under two circumstances. The first arises when the defendant argues that
the joinder of offenses does not satisfy the explicit language
of Rule 8(A)- i.e., misjoinder. The second arises when
joinder is proper under Rule 8(A) but is prejudicial to the defendant in some manner. The defendant would then invoke
Rule 14, which allows the court to bifurcate the offenses into
separate trials should circumstances warrant.
UNDERLYING POLICIES
Joinder of offenses is justified primarily for reasons of
administrative efficiency. The law favors joinder and the
avoidance of multiple trials. See State v. Richey, 64 Ohio
St.3d 353, 365, 595 N.E.2d 915 (1992), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 989 (1993); State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163, 555
N.E.2d 293 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1017 (1990).
"Joinder conserves judicial and prosecutorial time, lessens
the not inconsiderable expenses of multiple trials, diminishes inconvenience to witnesses, and minimizes the possibili-

ty of incongruous results in successive trials before different
juries." State v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St.2d 223, 225, 400
N.E.2d 401 (1980). See also State v. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d
340, 421 N.E.2d 1288 (1981); State v. Dunkins, 10 Ohio
App.3d 72, 460 N.E.2d 688 (1983).
Under some circumstances, joinder of offenses may accrue to a defendant's advantage. As two commentators
have pointed out: "Being called upon to defend himself in a
number of trials may be harassing to a defendant and be a
disadvantage far outweighing the prejudice which may result from a joinder. It is possible for the prosecutor to withhold some of the charges and file them as detainers, thus
making it difficult for defendant to get parole." Remington &
Joseph, Charging, Convicting, and Sentencing the Multiple
Criminal Offender, 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 528, 538-39.
Joinder can, however, also be prejudicial to defendants.
Evidence of guilt-of one offense may lead a jury to convict
on a joined offense, which might have resulted in acquittal
had there been separate trials.
JOINDER OF OFFENSES: RULE S(A}
Rule 8(A) provides that two or more offenses may be
charged together in one indictment, information, or complaint if the offenses (1) are of the same or similar character,
(2) are based on the same act or transaction, (3) are based
on two or more acts or transactions constituting parts of a
common scheme or plan, or (4) are part of a course of criminal conduct. See State v. Hamblin, 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 524
N.E.2d 476 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 975 (1988).
Moreover, felonies and misdemeanors may be joined in one
charging instrument. See State v. Hammer, 82 Ohio App.3d
663, 612 N.E.2d 1300 (1992); Becker v. State, 39 Ohio App.
496, 177 N.E. 605 (1930).
Examples of offenses that may properly be joined include
charges of:
(1) aggravated burglary with a different case involving
aggravated murder and aggravated burglary, State v.
Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 580 N.E.2d 1 (1991 ), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 960 (1992);
(2) breaking & entering and larceny, Carter v. Maxwell,
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Multiple Charges for One Offense

177 Ohio St. 35, 201 N.E.2d 705 (1964);
(3) forgery and uttering a forged instrument, State v.
Atkinson, 4 Ohio St.2d 19, 211 N.E.2d 665 (1965);
(4) aggravated burglary and theft, State v. Durham, 49
Ohio App.2d 231, 233, 360 N.E.2d 743 (1976) (both offenses based on the same act or transaction);
(5) armed robbery stemming from separate and distinct
incidents, State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 582 N.E.2d 972
(1992), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1227 (1992); and
(6) breaking & entering and arson, State v. Richey, 64
Ohio St.3d 353, 365, 595 N.E.2d 915 (1992), cert. denied,
507 u.s. 989 (1993).
The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d
160,555 N.E.2d 293 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1017
(1990), upheld the joinder of 1983 aggravated burglary and
petty theft charges with 1986 aggravated murder, robbery,
burglary, arson, and kidnapping charges involving the same
victim and house.

Occasionally, a prosecutor may attempt to charge a defendant for one offense in multiple indictments or in multiple
counts in the same indictment. Under Criminal Rule 14, the
court may require the prosecutor to elect which indictment
to proceed upon where the offenses charged arise out of a
single act. But election is not required under Criminal Rule
13 if the offenses could properly have been joined in a single indictment or complaint.
While this appears clear, some statutes may not specify
whether they cover one criminal offense or more than one.
For example, in State v. Trocodaro, 40 Ohio App.2d 50, 317
N.E.2d 418 (1973), the defendant was charged under the
same statute in separate indictments for felony murder and
premeditated murder arising out of the same act. The court
found that election was not required because the two offenses are separate and distinct under the "same evidence"
test even though the offenses are defined in the same
statute. "'Murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery
and murder committed with deliberate and premeditated
malice are not one and the same offense, even though the
victim is one and the same person."' ld. at 52 (quoting State
v. Ferguson, 175 Ohio St. 390, 394, 195 N.E.2d 794
(1964)).
Also, in Reed v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 356, 1_99 N.E.2d
737 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 866 (1964), the Supreme
Court held that robbery and rape committed on the same
victim within a short span of time are separate and distinct
crimes and may properly be charged as such in separate indictments or counts.

Limitations
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While Criminal Rule S(A) appears by its broad language
to permit joinder of a wide range of offenses, courts have
established limits on the nature of crimes that may be
joined. For example, in Ohio, offenses connected only in
the "discovery" of their commission may not be joined. In
State v. Atkinson, 4 Ohio St.2d 19, 211 N.E.2d 665 (1965),
the indictment contained counts of (1) forging a check, (2)
uttering a forged instrument, and (3) carrying a concealed
. weapon. The weapon had been found during a search for
the forged documents, and the Ohio Supreme Court held
that the concealed weapon charge was improperly joined
since its only relationship with the forgery charges was their
common discovery. Some federal decisions reach the opposite result. While the federal counterpart to Criminal Rule
S(A) is nearly identical, a federal court has found that the
discovery nexus for joinder, which Ohio has rejected, is a
proper justification for joinder. In United States v. Pietras,
501 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1071
(1974), an unregistered gun was discovered in a search of a
getaway van used for a robbery and kidnapping. Although
the gun was not used in those activities, the Eighth Circuit
upheld the joinder of the gun charge. See also United
States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding drugs
and gun in a search was a sufficient nexus).

SEVERANCE: RULE 14
If offenses are properly joined under Rule S(A), the defendant may nonetheless seek a severance pursuant to
Rule 14. Where it appears that either the defendant or the
state will be prejudiced by joinder of offenses, Rule 14 provides that "the court shall order an election or separate trial
of counts ... or provide such other relief as justice requires."
In Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir.
1964), the court of appeals outlined how a defendant might
be prejudiced by the joinder of offenses.
The argument against joinder is that the defendant
may be prejudiced for one or more of the following reasons: (1) he may become embarrassed or confounded
in presenting separate defenses; (2) the jury may use
the evidence of one of the crimes charged to infer a
criminal disposition on the part of the defendant from
which is found his guilt of the other crime or crimes
charged; or (3) the jury may cumulate the evidence of
the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not so find. A less tangible
but perhaps equally persuasive element of prejudice
may reside in a latent feeling of hostility engendered
by the charging of several crimes as distinct from only
one.
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court in McElroy v.
United States, 164 U.S. 76, 80 (1896), commented:
[T]he multiplication of distinct charges has been considered so objectionable as tending to confound the
accused in his defense, or to prejudice him as to his
challenges, in the matter of being held out to be habitually criminal, in the distraction of the attention of the
jury or otherwise, that it is the settled rule in England

MULTIPLE INDICTMENTS & COMPLAINTS: RULE 13
Criminal Rule 13 governs joinder where there is more
than one charging instrument. Here, again, the law favors
joinder for policy reasons. There are times that the defendant may want to consolidate charges for one trial. If the
prosecutor obtains separate indictments in order to try a defendant several times for related offenses, the defendant
may move to consolidate under Rule 13.
At other times, however, a defendant may not want unrelated offenses joined for trial. In State v. Clements, 98 Ohio
App.3d 797, 649 N.E.2d 912 (1994), the defendant was indicted for burglary and on a later date for aggravated robbery with a firearms specification. The court of appeals
ruled that the defendant was denied a fair trial when the trial
court denied a defense motion objecting to the joinder of
those charges where the offenses occurred at different
times and locations, involved different victims, different witnesses, and different evidence.
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and in many of our states, to confine the indictment to
one distinct offense or restrict the evidence to one
transaction.

injury of the accused, there is no error." This statement
overlooks the explicit language of Rule 14, which specifies
that once prejudice has been found, ''the court shall order
an election or separate trial of counts, grant severance of
defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires."
In contrast, Federal Rule 14 provides that the court may
sever in the case of prejudice. The drafters of the Ohio
Rules clearly made a conscious choice to limit the trial
court's discretion once prejudice has been established. As
one court has noted: "[W]hile the federal courts have discretion in granting severance, our rule provides that if prejudice is shown ~the court shall order' severance." State v.
Owens, 51 OhioApp.2d 132,145,366 N.E.2d 1367 1375
(1975),

Prejudice
(
.

The burden is on the party seeking severance to demon..trate prejudice. State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 595
N.E.2d 915 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 989 (1993). "The
burden of demonstrating prejudice is a difficult one, and the
ruling of the trial judge will rarely be disturbed on review.
The defendant must show something more than the fact
that a separate trial might offer him a better chance of acquittal." State v. Henderson, No. 963, 964, 965 (11th Dist.
Ct. App., Geauga, 7-23-82) (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385
u.s. 554 (1967)).
The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Torres, 66 Ohio
St.2d 340, 343, 42i N.E2d 1288 (i98i), adopted a threepart test which must be met to show error on the part of the
trial court in refusing to sever charges. Part one states that
"[a] defendant claiming error in the trial court's refusal to
allow separate trials under multiple charges under Criminal
Rule 14 has the burden of affirmatively showing that his
rights were prejudiced." Part two requires that the defendant furnish ''the trial court with sufficient information so that
it can weigh considerations favoring joinder against the defendant's right to a fair trial." Part three requires that "he
must demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in refusing to separate the charges for trial." A reviewing court
will reverse the trial court's decision only on a showing of
abuse of discretion which "connotes more than an error of
law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable." See State v. Adams,
62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).
i
A defendant demonstrated prejudice in a aggravated
murder case where the trial court refused to sever a charge
of abuse of a corpse. Although the victim was the same,
the crimes occurred four days apart. The court of appeals
found that the prosecution did not overcome defendant's
showing of prejudice because the videotape that proved the
lesser offense would not have been admissible in a separate trial for aggravated murder. State v. Van Sickle, 90
Ohio App.3d 301, 629 N.E.2d 39 (1993) (any limited probative value that videotape had was outweighed by prejudice
resulting from its gruesome depiction of body burned beyond recognition).
It is not error for a court to refuse to separate offenses
arising out of the same conduct where the defendant has
demanded a jury trial for the more serious offense and has
not for the less serious offenses. State v. Hammer, 82 Ohio
App.3d 663, 612 N.E.2d 1300 (1992).

I

. T~e decision to make Rule 14 mandatory rather than permiSSive probably resulted from criticism of the federal
courts' reluctance to grant severance liberally under the federal rule. See 8 Moore's Federal Practice and Procedure 84 (Cipes ed 1979) ("Rule 14 is available, but such availability tends to be more theoretical than real."); 1 Wright,
Federal Practice and Procedure 305 (1969} ("Given the evident r~luctance of trial and appellate courts to grant separate tnals under Rule 14, a broad interpretation of Rule 8
means broad joinder, whether or not this is just or fair."}.
Federal authorities, therefore, cannot be used in an unthinking fashion; the Ohio Rule was designed to overrule some
of these authorities.
SEPARATE DEFENSES
Prejudice under Rule 14 may arise, as illustrated by
Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1964},
where the accused has separate defenses. Cross was
charged with two counts of robbery. In a joint indictment,
Cross was charged in count I with robbery of a church rectory.on February 23, 1962 and in count II with robbery of a
tounst home on May 2, 1962. Prior to trial, the defendant
moved to sever the two offenses so that he could testify on
one count only. His testimony on count II was convincing that he was a victim and not a cohort of the armed robbers
who entered the tourist home behind him. His testimony on
count I was evasive and unconvincing. The denial of his
motion to sever was held to be reversible error.
If he testifies on one count, he runs the risk that any
adverse effects will influence the jury's consideration
of the other count. Thus he bears the risk on both
counts, although he may benefit on only one.
Moreover, a defendant's silence on one count would
be damaging in the face of this express denial of the
other. Thus he may be coerced into testifying on the
count upon which he wished to remain silent. It is not
necessary to decide whether this invades his constitutional right to remain silent, since we think it constitutes
prejudice within the meaning of Rule 14.
To prevail on this ground, however, the defendant must
make a convincing showing. The defendant must produce
sufficient information regarding the nature of the testimony
he wishes to give in the one case and the reasons for not
wishing to testify in the other to satisfy the court that the
claim of prejudice is genuine. State v. Roberts, 62 Ohio
St.2d 170,405 N.E.2d 247 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
879 (1980}. A showing that a defendant would prefer totestify on one count but not on the other count does not
demonstrate that joinder was prejudicial. State v. Grunden,
65 OhioApp.3d 777,585 N.E.2d 487 (1989).

Federal Rule
The joinder and severance rules found in the Federal
Rules are, in many-respects, identical to the Ohio Rules.
Thus, it is not surprising that federal cases would provide interpretive guidance for issues arising under the Ohio Rules.
See State v. Owens, 51 Ohio App.2d 132, 145, 366 N. E.2d
1367, 1375 (1975) ("[T]he construction of Fed. R. Crim. P.
14 by the federal courts is of help in this case."}.
There are, however, several important differences be:Ween the Ohio and Federal Rules. In State v. Durham, 49
Ohio App.2d 231, 233, 360 N.E.2d 743 (1976), for example,
the court emphasized that the decision to grant a severance
"rests in the sound discretion of the [trial] court" and
"[u]nless the discretion has been exercised to the manifest
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(1949). Even if character evidence is not introduced, the
jury may nonetheless infer a bad character or criminal disposition because multiple offenses are tried together.
This risk is especially troublesome when Rule S(A) joinder is based on crimes "of the same or similar character" ,1
that are not part of a single scheme or plan. Here, the justi'
fications for joinder - "avoiding duplicitous, time consuming
trials in which the same factual and legal issues must be litigated"- are not applicable. ABA Standards Relating to
Joinder and Severance 29 (1968). "[S]ince the offenses on
trial are distinct, trial of each is likely to require its own evidence and witnesses. The time spent where similar offenses are joined may not be as long as two trials butthe time
saved by impanelling only one jury and by setting the defendant's background only once seems minimal." Note, Joint
and Single Trials Under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 74 Yale L.J. 553, 560 (1965).
While the Rule permits joinder of the same or similar offenses, the absence of strong policy reasons for this type of
joinder should be considered by a court ruling on a motion
to sever offenses under Rule 14. See ABA Standards
Relating to Joinder and Severance§ 2.2(a) (1968) (providing for severance as a matter of right when the same or
similar offenses are joined).

CUMULATION OF EVIDENCE
severaAce of charges often arguethat trying the charges together will encourage cumulation
of evidence by the jury. That is, a jury may not be able to
distinguish the evidence for each particular charge and will
tend to apply or accumulate evidence from one count to another count. ''We all know that, if you can pile up a number
of charges against a man, it is quite often the case that the
jury will convict, where, if they were listening to the evidence
on one charge only, they would find it wholly insufficient."
Maguire, Proposed New Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 23 Ore. L. Rev. 56, 58-59 (1943).
Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 189 (D.C. Cir.
1966), exemplifies this point. In reversing the defendant's
conviction, the court commented:
The point is that a severance should have been granted because ... the joinder was prejudicial under Rule
14 . . . . Here there was not only the danger of the evidence with respect to the two robberies cumulating in
the jurors' minds tending to prove the defendant guilty
of each, but the evidence as to one of the robberies
was so weak as to lead one to question its sufficiency
to go to the jury. Thus its primary usefulness in this
trial was to support the Government's case as to the
robbery which resulted in the murder.
See also United States v. Carter, 475 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir.
1973); State v. Jonas, 363 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Conn. 1975).
The Ohio Supreme Court addressed this issue in State v.
Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340,343,421 N.E.2d 1288 (1981),
where the defendant was tried on two separate indictments
of selling drugs. The Court found that the evidence as to
each charge was uncomplicated but noted, "Joinder may be
prejudicial when the offenses are unrelated and the evidence as to each is very weak." Where the evidence relative to the various charges is simple, distinct, and uncomplicated, however, the jury is believed capable of segregating
the proof on each charge and obeying trial court instructions. Thus, any effects of a spill-over between the offenses
are insubstantial, and any prejudice harmless. State v.
Roberts, 62 Ohio St.2d 170, 405 N.E.2d 247 (1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 879 (1980).
[)~fendantsseekiAg

i.:
. t·...

,_
t

Evidence Rule 404(8)
Severance, however, may not obviate this problem because even if the offenses are tried separately, the severed
offenses may be admissible under Evidence Rule 404(B).
In this event, the defendant would still face the risk that the
jury would improperly infer criminal disposition. See State v.
Owens, 51 OhioApp.2d 132,366 N.E.2d 1367 (1975).
Note, however, that the joinder requirements of Rule 8(A) ·~
are broader than the admissibility requirements of Rule 404.
See 1 Giannelli & Snyder, Baldwin's Ohio Practice Evidence
§ 404.16 (1996).
Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964), is a
leading case on this issue. Drew was convicted of robbery
and attempted robbery. The robbery occurred at a High's
Diary store on July 27, 1962. The perpetrator was a male
with sunglasses who said, ''This is a holdup." When the
clerk hesitated, the robber brandished a gun. The attempt
occurred on August 13 at another High's Dairy store. The
perpetrator was a same-race male wearing sunglasses. He
told the clerk, "Give me the money." The clerk responded
by saying "come and get it." The perpetrator repeated the
demand several times and then said, "You are not going to
give it." The clerk said, "No." When a customer entered the
store, the perpetrator fled. Drew was arrested within 25
minutes and identified. The Court concluded that these offenses would not be admissible as "other crimes" evidence
because they were not sufficiently similar. Moreover, the
two incidents were confused. The witness responses
showed confusion as to which crime counsel referred to and
the prosecutor "lumped the two together" during summation.
The Ohio Supreme Court has addressed this issue on
several occasions. In these cases, admissibility under the
Evidence Rule 404(B) is first determined:
[T]he Wilson and Jackson crimes share a similar
modus operandi with the murder. In each case, ~~~
Waddy entered a woman's apartment at night; he
bound the victim's wrists behind her back and tied her
ankles; he used a knife; he called each victim a "bitch";
he took the victim's car or car keys; and he stole or demanded bank cards or credit cards. The crimes oc-

CHARACTER & BAD ACTS
Joinder of offenses may have a negative impact on the
jurors' feelings about the defendant. "Improper joinder may
not only confuse a jury but may create an unfavorable impression in their minds as to an appellant's character before
any evidence has been admitted as to his guilt or innocence." State v. Minneker, 27 Ohio St.2d 155, 157-58, 271
N.E.2d 821 (1971). For example, where a particularly
heinous or disgusting crime is joined with an offense of an
entirely different and less offensive character, the prosecutor's opening statement alone might predispose the jurors
against defendant because of the more heinous charge and
lead them to find guilt on the unconnected charge.
Moreover, the possibility that the jury will convict because
the defendant possesses a criminal disposition is always a
risk. Shielding the defendant from this possibility underlies
the rule, long recognized in Ohio, that the state may not introduce evidence of the defendant's bad character or reputation unless the defendant first introduces evidence of his
good character. See State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 40002, 358 N.E.2d 623 (1976), vacated in part, 438 U.S. 910
(1976); State v. Cochrane, 151 Ohio St. 128, 84 N.E.2d 7 42
4
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dence. When not renewed, it is waived." This statement is
troublesome for several reasons. Fir'st, the Owens court
cited federal authorities to support its position. Its citations,
however, were selective. The federal courts have not followed a uniform rule on the waiver issue. Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court in Shaffer v. United States,
362 U.S. 511, 516 (1960), spoke of the trial judge's "continuing duty at all stages of the trial to grant a severance if prejudice does appear." Second, Rule 12(B)(5) requires severance motions under Rule 14 to be made prior to trial.
Motions not made prior to trial are waived. Therefore, the
waiver issue is explicitly covered in the Rules, and the
Rules do not require that the motion be renewed during trial.
Nevertheless, a prudent attorney should renew the motion
to avoid any problem.

curred within a three-month period and within walking
distance of each other. State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d
424, 429, 588 N.E.2d 819 (1992) (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 921 (1992).
See also State v. Coleman, 37 Ohio St.3d 286, 292, 525
J.E.2d 792 (1988) ("[S]imilarities in the crimes indicate
there is strong likelihood that the offender in the solved
crime also committed the unsolved crime."), cert. denied,
488 u.s. 900 (1988).
MOTION TO SEVER
An appreciation of the relationship between Rules 8 and
14 is fundamental to an understanding of joinder and severance. Severance under Rule 14 requires a showing of prejudice. That provision, however, is operable only in the case
of a proper joinder under Rule 8. If the joinder is improper
(misjoinder), then severance is automatic and prejudice
need not be shown. Leading commentators on the Federal
Rules agree on this point. Professor Wright has written:
"[Motions for misjoinder] raise only a question of law. If
there has been misjoinder, the trial court has no discretion
to deny the motion, and the appellate court may not consider the failure to do so harmless error." 1 Wright, Federal
Practice and Procedure 337 (1969). See also id. at 432
("Rule 14 comes into play only if the original joinder was
proper. It permits a severance, despite the propriety of the
original joinder, if needed to avoid prejudice."). See also 8
Moore's Federal Practice 8-14 (Cipes ed. 1993) ("[A] pleading which fails to comply with the minimum standards of
joinder should be treated as conclusively prejudicial. This
means that where the trial judge determines that offenses or
defendants have been misjoined, he has no discretion to
peny relief."); United States v. Piacente, 490 F.2d 661, 665
(7th Cir. 1973) ("When joinder is improper, severance is the
appropriate remedy and there is no discretion in the court's
ruling.").
This point was ignored in State v. Durham, 49 Ohio
App.2d 231, 233, 360 N.E.2d 743 (1976), in which the court
stated: 'Where an indictment charges two or more distinct
offenses, even if improperly joined, the exercise of authority
to compel the prosecutor to make an election [or grant a
severance] rests in the sound discretion of the court, to be
exercised in the promotion of justice and upon good cause
shown." This passage is dictum because the two counts in
Durham- aggravated burglary and theft - were properly
joined under Rule 8(A) since both offenses were "based on
the same act or transactions." Durham illustrates the necessity for counsel to inform the court of the precise basis
for a motion to sever. If there is a misjoinder of offenses, a
motion to sever should specify that Rule 8, rather than Rule
14, is the basis of the motion. Otherwise, counsel may be
required to establish prejudice as specified in Rule 14.
Motions for severance based on misjoinder are made
pursuant to Rule 12(B)(2); motions for severance based on
prejudicial joinder are made pursuant to Rule 12(B)(5).
Both motions, however, must be made before trial. Motions
not made prior to trial are waived under Rule 12(G).

Proof in Support of Motion
When making a motion to sever, counsel should specify
the grounds on which the motion is based and introduce evidence or make an offer of proof in support of the motion. A
mere allegation of prejudice will not suffice. Two pre-Rules
cases addressed this issue. In State v. Perod, 15 Ohio
App.2d 115, 122, 239 N.E.2d 100 (1968), the court overruled a motion to sever, stating: "The record shows a request by motion for a separate trial but a total failure to
show cause." In State v. Fields, 29 Ohio App.2d 154, 158,
279 N.E.2d 616 (1971 ), the court adopted a somewhat different position. According to that court, good cause may be
shown "in any manner consistent with proof of motions generally, including a showing by the professional statement of
counsel."

Appeals
If the defendant has preserved the right to appeal by renewing the motion for severance or election at trial, the
proper means of raising the issue after trial is on appeal and
not in habeas corpus. Braxton v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d
134, 136; 205 N£.2d 397 (1965).
DUPLICITY
Criminal Rule 8(A) prohibits the misjoinder of offenses
-the unauthorized charging of unrelated offenses in an indictment. Joinder also encompasses the more difficult
problem of duplicity - alleging more than one distinct offense within a single count of an indictment or complaint.
"The test of duplicity is whether proof of one [offense] would
tend to establish guilt of the other." State v. Peters, 112
Ohio St.249, 260, 147 N.E. 81 (1924). But, duplicity is not
fatal to an indictment. Rather than dismiss the indictment,
the court should order that the duplicitous counts be separated.

Alternate Means
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that it is not duplicitous to charge in a single count alternative methods of committing a crime. In State v. Daniels, 169 Ohio St. 87, 157
N.E.2d 736 (1959), the defendant was charged with rape
under a statute that defined rape of either a daughter or sister, or a child under twelve. The indictment charged rape of
a daughter and, alternatively, rape of a child under twelve.
The Court found no repugnancy between these charges because finding one did not necessarily preclude finding the
other: "This court has recognized that, where a single offense may be committed in any one of two or more different
ways, a count is not duplicitous which charges the commission of the offense conjunctively in two ways, provided there

Renewal at Trial
It is critical, however, that a motion, when denied, be rehewed at trial to preserve the right to appeal. For example,
in State v. Owens, 51 Ohio App.2d 132, 146, 366 N.E.2d
1367 (1975), the defendant appealed the denial of his pretrial motion to sever, but the motion "was not renewed either
after the state rested or at the conclusion of all of the evi-
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is no repugnancy between the ways charged.". ld. at 103 (citing Hah:tv._State, 58 Ohio St. 676,~5_1_N.E. 154 (1898)).
Similarly, an indictment or count may contain specifications
that do not necessarily lead to a single theory or motive. In
State v. Hancock, 48 Ohio St.2d 147, 149, 358 N.E.2d 273
(1976), vacated in part, 438 U.S. 911 (1978), the Supreme
Court construed an indictment charging the defendant with
aggravated murder in which the three specifications presented differing theories - murder to escape detection, murder
as part of a purposeful course of conduct, and murder while
fleeing an aggravated robbery. In upholding the indictment,
the Court was "not persuaded that three specifications of aggravation must be mutually exclusive. A consistent theory of
an offense can encompass mixed motives."

ment suffers from multiplicity and the counts are tried separately, then double jeopardy bars subsequent prosecution."
Stratton was charged with possession of drugs in incidents
that took place simultaneously and involved the same statutory provision. The state sought to convict the defendant separately for each of the three types of drugs possessed. The
court examined the statute to determine whether the legislature intended possession of each substance to constitute a
separate offense and, after noting that "doubts must be resolved in favor of the defendant," held that ''the simultaneous
possession of several controlled substances constitutes a single offense." State v. Stratton, 5 Ohio App.3d 228, 232 451
N.E.2d 520 (1982).
The rule against seriatim trials on a multiplicity of charges
also applies when the charges are brought in different counties. In State v. Urvan, 4 Ohio App.3d 151, 446 N.E.2d 1161
(1982), the defendant was charged in Medina County with receiving stolen property and, based on the same course of
conduct, later charged in Cuyahoga County with grand theft.
The defendant was admitted to a pretrial diversion program in
Medina County under a contract embracing both charges, but
only the Medina County charge was nailed following his successful completion of the program. The court of appeals held
that bringing the defendant to trial on the Cuyahoga County
charge would amount to double jeopardy. Both charges could
have been brought in either county under the venue statute,
R.C. 2901.12, but the state could not split venue in order to
bring successive prosecutions because such a practice exemplifies the hazard the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to prevent. Jeopardy in this case attached upon defendant's successful completion of the pretrial diversion program, which must be considered the equivalent of served
time or completed probation.
[l]f the program is to make logical sense and traffic at all
in fair treatment, the state's election to pursue the crime
of stolen property forecloses its right to undertake pursuit of the grand theft charge through a second agent ..
.. Jeopardy must attach as a result of the activity of the
first [agent]. ld. at 156.
Collateral Estoppel
In addition, although Ohio law does not mandate that related offenses be joined, the United States Supreme Court
has included the doctrine of collateral estoppel within the protection of double jeopardy, and a failure to join some related
offenses in one trial may preclude the state from subsequent
prosecutions. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444-45
(1970), the Court defined collateral estoppel as occurring
when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined in
the defendant's favor by a valid and finEJ.I judgment. "Where
a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general
verdict, ... this approach requires a court to examine the
record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charges, and other relevant matters, and
conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks
to foreclose from consideration." Ashe was charged with six
separate counts of armed robbery and was tried on one
count and acquitted, the identity of the defendant being the ·~
single issue in dispute. Collateral estoppel precluded the
subsequent prosecution of the defendant for another count of
armed robbery.

AlliED OFFENSES OF SIMILAR IMPORT
R.C. 294 i .25 provides that where the offenses with which

the defendant is charged are allied offenses of similar import,
"the indictment or information may contain counts for all such
offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one."
Ohio law allows the state to charge a defendant with two allied offenses, but convict on only one. The prosecution may
introduce evidence as to both offenses and is not required to
elect one of the two and to proceed to trial only on that
charge. State v. Ryan, 17 Ohio App.3d 150, 478 N.E.2d 257
(1984).
Conve~sely, if the acts constitute offenses of dissimilar import or result in the same or similar offenses committed at different times or with separate animus, the defendant may be
tried and convicted on each count. The statute is meant to
prevent "shotgun" charges. The difficulty in applying the pro. ,. vision lies in construing the phrase "allied offenses of similar
' import."
In State v. Brown, 7 OhioApp.3d 113, 117,454 N.E.2d 596
(1982), the court of appeals stated the test as follows: if "(1)
the state relies upon the same conduct to support both offenses, (2) ... the offenses and their elements correspond to
such a degree that commission of one of the offenses ... will
result in commission of the other, ... and (3) ... the commission of both offenses was motivated by the same purpose,"
the offenses are allied offenses of similar import. According
to the court, if the acts complained of are allied offenses of
similar import, the defendant may still be convicted of both if
the offenses were "committed separately or with a separate
animus as to each." ld. at 116.
In Brown, the defendant burned an infant for whom he was
babysitting. The infant later died of the burns, and subsequently the defendant was convicted and sentenced under
both the child endangering statute and the involuntary
manslaughter statute. The court concluded that proof of the
greater offense required proof of the lesser, and thus the state
relied on the same conduct to prove both offenses. There
was no evidence of a separate purpose as to each offense.
Therefore, the defendant had been improperly convicted of allied offenses of similar import.
MULTIPLICITY & DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Multiplicity is the opposite of duplicity; it is the charging of a
single crime in multiple counts. Rule 8(A) specifically precludes multiplicity (where the offense is stated in several
counts of the indictment). Several courts have held that multiplicious charges may raise double jeopardy issues. For example, in State v. Stratton, 5 Ohio App.3d 228, 230, 451
N.E.2d 520 (1982), the court of appeals wrote: "If an indict6

